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United States, China, Taiwan:
A Precarious Triangle
Murray Weidenbaum
A Keynote Address to the Conference
on the Greater China Economy
St. Louis, Missouri
March 25, 2000

Whether Napoleon really said it or not,
the forecast often attributed to him is likely
to be essentially correct: "China is a sleeping giant. When it wakes, it will move the
world." China's 1.2 billion people combined
with its record-breaking 20 years of rapid
growth make it likely that the Middle Kingdom will become the second economic
superpower sometime during the twentyfirst century.
Nevertheless, an old Mandarin proverb
states, "If you think you understand
China, you don't really understand." That
waming also sums up the challenges that
face Americans in dealing with that fascinating national array of strengths and
weaknesses. When viewed separately,
each of the many aspects of policy involving China is difficult-economic, political,
military, and environmental. However,
when we consider the many interrelationships and then add the third part of the
triangle-Taiwan-the policy challenges
become increasingly complicated. Let us
try to deal with this vital cluster of issues
a step at a time.

Murray Weidenbaum is chairman of the
Center for the Study of American Business
and Mallinckrodt Distinguished University
Professor at Washington University in St. Louis.
His book, Business and Government in the
Global Marketplace, is in its sixth edition.
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Economic Relations
Let us begin with the economic relationships. Any way that we look at it, China
is becoming an important economic power
once again. Using a form of comparing
national economies known as purchasing
power parity, the Chinese economy is now
more than half as large as that of the United
States and larger than Japan's. More conventional measures show China in seventh
place, but coming up rapidly. 1
China is now the ninth largest trading
nation in the world. It is a major trading
partner of the United States. More than $70
billion of commerce flows each year between
our two nations. But the term "partner,"
which President Clinton introduced into
the public dialogue, is a misleading euphemism for a very uneven set of commercial
flows. The United States imports from
China more than five times the dollar
amount of our exports to them. This relationship is far more out of balance than
our trade with Japan. 2 Yet, unlike the case
of Japan, most of the opposition to continuing normal trading relationships with
China does not arise from those who believe they are hurt by the large excess of
imports. Rather, it emanates from groups
concerned primarily with non-economic
factors, notably the harsh treatment of
religious minorities, political dissidents,
and Tibetans.
Aside from low-priced clothing, toys,
and electronic parts, trade with China is
not a significant portion of the American
economy. However, the United States is the
destination of almost one-third of China's
exports. Our commerce is a key way in
which that nation acquires technology. Our
trade also generates a substantial part of
China's large accumulation of foreign currencies. China maintained a rapid rate of
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economic growth while fmancial problems
were besetting East Asia in 1997 and 1998.
However, serious signs of weakness are
visible, notably sluggish exports, stagnant
industrial production, and inefficient state
industries.
Nevertheless, mainland China and Taiwan have been the two bright spots in an
otherwise troubled East Asian economic
scene. Despite the political difficulties,
which I will cover in a moment, the economic relationships across the Taiwan
straits have remained strong and substantial.

China is now the ninth largest
trading nation in the world. It is
a major trading partner of the
United States. More than $70
billion of commerce flows each
year between our two nations.

It is one of the great ironies of our time

that so many of the people who fled the
mainland in 1949-or their descendentshave been returning to their ancestral
home in a very special way. From Taiwan
as well as elsewhere in the Chinese
diaspora, they have brought with them
much of the money and managerial skills
that have been so essential to the economic
success of China, especially in moving
toward a modern capitalistic economy.
Other indicators of the special nature of
the cross-straits interrelationships are also
impressive-the large numbers of tourists
from Taiwan who visit the mainland, the
rising number of telephone calls across the
straits, as well as the numerous cultural
and intellectual exchanges. 3
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Viewed from this side of the Pacific, the
two sectors of Greater China seem extremely
complementary, especially in an economic
sense. The mainland possesses the land,
the workforce, and increasingly a major
market while Taiwan provides the entrepreneurial and business skills enhanced
by very substantial financial flows (over $40
billion to date). According to Li-Lu, a
Tiananmen Square student leader now in
the United States, " ... business is the ultimate force for democratic change in
China."4 Apparently, this is a compelling
truth whose power frightens much of the
traditional communist leadership in China.
Two-way trade between Taiwan and the
mainland is now running at about $25
billion a year.

According to Li-Lu, a Ti.ananmen
Square student leader now in
the United States, tt••• business is
the ultimate force for democratic
change in China."

A recent survey of 96 multinationals
operating in China reported that 62 percent
had overestimated the market potential and
an almost equal number (61 percent) had
experienced poorer profit performance than
they had expected. 6 Those percentages do
leave room for some outstanding successes.
Procter & Gamble dominates the market for
soaps and shampoos. Coca-Cola far outsells
Hainan coconut juice, and Ken-de-ji is wellknown in the larger cities (that's Kentucky
Fried Chicken to Westemers).
In contrast to the open U.S. market,
numerous obstacles face American exporters to China, such as onerous licensing procedures. Compulsory registration applies to
hundreds of products, typically electrical
equipment and machinery. Moreover, U.S.
producers of computer software, video
tapes, compact discs, books, and motion
pictures suffer because their products are
frequently copied illegally in China. This
intellectual piracy reduces potential U.S.
exports to China and to the rest of the world
by an estimated $2 billion a year. 7 It also is
a growing source of economic and political
friction. "Piracy," it should be noted, is more
of a Westem concept than an Asian one.

In contrast, the complementarities between the American and the Chinese
economies, although considerable, are not
nearly so great. Of course, some Americans
barely restrain their enthusiasm when they
consider a market potential in excess of
1 billion customers. An example of this line
of thinking was the late Ron Brown. When
Secretary of Commerce, he declared,
"China ... is the pot at the end of the rainbow."5 My own research leads me to a far
more restrained conclusion. It is the rare
U.S. company doing business in China that
reports eaming profits on its operations in
that nation. Rather, they like to talk about
their rosy forecasts of future sales.

The political relationships between
China and the United States are even more
difficult to fathom than the economic.
President Clinton described the state of
Sino-U.S. ties as "a strategic partnership."
Yet very few aspects of a true partnership
are present. It is Japan that cooperates
with us in a variety of important foreign
policy activities, including financing a considerable portion of the Gulf War. The two
nations also share a common outlook toward
democracy, private enterprise, and personal freedom.

4
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Political Relations

On the other hand, there is no direct
basis for confrontation between China and
the United States. We do not share a common border nor do we hold competing
claims for territory. However, significant
differences in fundamental values are
clearly visible in terms of the treatment of
citizens by the govemment, especially in
regard to personal freedoms-political,
economic, and religious.
The limited amount of individual liberty
available in China galls many Americans.
Especially upsetting is the persecution of
Christian groups and the jailing of political dissidents. It is difficult for the United
States to accept the idea of a "partnership"
with a nation that engages in such offensive practices.
On the positive side, in recent years
China has relaxed the rules governing
everyday life for the typical citizen. A substantial decentralization of power has
taken place and greater latitude has been
provided to private enterprise. The impacts
ofWestem culture and commerce have been
pervasive, especially in the larger cities.
U.S. corporations doing business in
China serve to advance our human rights
goals. They create safer workplaces, follow
more progressive personnel practices, raise
living standards, and bring in new ideas,
attitudes, and ways of thinking. American
companies, such as Mattei, have adopted
codes of conduct requiring local su bcontractors and suppliers to avoid child labor
and other practices inconsistent with U.S.
standards. 8 More indirectly, commercial
products and advertising carry a powerful
implicit message of personal choice.
Substantial portions of China's population recognize such American brand
names as Coca-Cola, Jeep, Head and
Shoulders, Marlboro, Mickey Mouse, and
Kodak. Young women often wear miniskirts

The situation became murkier when
important groups in Taiwan began to talk
about independence and its govemmental
leader described relations between China
and Taiwan as "state-to-state." The concem is raised a notch when the PRC states
that it is "under no obligation to commit
itself to rule out the use of force" in securing the reunification of Taiwan and the
mainland. 9 The frank discussions I have
had in both China and Taipei convince me
that this is an extremely difficult and sen-
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and use Westem-style makeup.
The role ofTaiwan adds significant complication to the Sino-U.S. political relationship. Officially, the United States recognizes
the People's Republic and only maintains
informal relations with Taipei. Our repeatedly stated national policy favors the voluntary unification of Taiwan into China,
but also provides military support to the
island in the event of force or the threat of
force on the part of the PRC. To put it
mildly, this is an unusual set of attitudes
and commitments. Until recently, the U.S.
position seemed to be reasonably workable
and was consistent with the expansion of
economic and cultural ties across the Taiwan straits.

U.S. corporations doing business
in China serve to advance our
human rights goals. They create
safer workplaces, follow more
progressive personnel practices,
raise living standards, and bring
in new ideas, attitudes, and
ways ofthinking.

sitive situation calling for a maximum of
restraint and patience on both sides. Surely,
the continuing U.S. policy of engagement
with China has also established an environment in which Taiwan has flourished. 10
When I have had background discussions with Taipei leaders, I hear about
their great success in achieving personal
liberty and economic expansion for the
island's citizens and the strong desire to
keep those hard-won gains. My informal
talks with mainland officials deal with
other considerations, such as national
pride and strategic matters. The two sets
of representatives seem to be on different
wavelengths. A meeting with the leaders
of one large China city was especially
memorable. Perhaps a bit naively, I stated
with some enthusiasm that our national
policy was to favor the attainment of a
unified China-on a voluntary basis.
The leader of the Chinese delegation
promptly responded, "Tell me, when the
South seceded from the Union, did you use
force?" My answer frankly did not satisfy
the Chinese officials, "Yes, but they fired
first." In the high-tech twenty-first century
that we have entered, it is possible to conjure up a new-style attack. For example, the
PRC could use its large foreign exchange
holdings to shake the Taiwan currency and
stock markets in order to destabilize the
island's political economy."

in some of the islands in the South China
Sea is a source of considerable concern.
The 1996 episode of China's missile testing in the Taiwan straits surely raised tensions in the region-as well as generating
a strong and rapid American response.

China presents little direct
military threat to the United
States, although it could be a
substantial destabilizing force in
East Asia.

The military area generates great uncertainty for American policymakers. China
is in the midst of a major effort to upgrade
its military capability. The acquisition from
Russia of destroyers with supersonic missiles is a cogent example. Is China motivated by the desire for regional hegemony?
Its imperious treatment of other nations

On the other hand, the current weapon
procurement effort may be interpreted as
defensive in nature. China's military capability is rudimentary compared to the
United States. Its troops are poorly
equipped by our standards, and their
weapons, in the main, are considered to
be obsolete. The Gulf War demonstrated
that such large stockpiles of outdated
equipment are of little use against a more
advanced opponent. Moreover, China currently lacks the ability to project its power
over water in any substantial way. It possesses a total of about 60 surface ships
and fewer than 10 modern submarines. 12
Thus, China presents little direct military
threat to the United States, although it
could be a substantial destabilizing force
in East Asia.
A less benign interpretation is also possible. China is procuring more sophisticated aircraft, ships, and missiles from
the cash-strapped countries of the former
Soviet Union. Over the past decade, it has
acquired several hundred SU-27 and SU-30
fighter jets and Soveremenny-class destroy-
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Military Relations

ers with Sunbum missiles. 13 Ranked by
explosive power, China's nuclear arsenal
is reported to be the world's third largest,
trailing only the United States and Russia. Chinese strategists may be working
toward the day when their nuclear and
missile forces can deter great power intervention in the Asia/Pacific theater and their
conventional forces can cow regional rivals.
Such a combination would allow, indeed
defme, local hegemony.
At present, there seems to be little
potential for extensive military action outside of an unintentional blunder into armed
conflict. Taiwan quickly comes to mind in
this connection, especially given the prospect of a competitive presidential election
campaign. China already focuses more of
its military resources on Taiwan than on
any other single area. In democracies, elections can be the occasion for a barrage of
wild charges and promises, which could
further exacerbate tensions across the Taiwan straits. On the other hand, China's
desire for a strong military establishment
may be understandable when viewed in
the light of its long history of defeat and
exploitation by foreign aggressors. Yet, over
the centuries it has played that role itself
in Southeast Asia. China's rising military
capability does enable it to apply pressure
on the rest of the region, thus perhaps
affecting the military balance between
China and its neighbors. 14

developed nations to major reductions in
emissions of carbon dioxide (C02), which are
generated primarily by using fossil fuels. The
treaty, which requires Senate approval,
would effectively exempt China and other
developing countries from its tough restrictions. That basic difference in national
treatment generates serious political difficulties in the United States. The Senate
has pledged to defeat any climate change
treaty that does not include the developing
nations. Reconciling the Senate position
with the Kyoto agreement will focus heavily
on the role of China, a prime emitter of C0 2 •

Even though air pollution is a
visibly serious problem (coal
generates 75 percent of its
energy}, China considers use of
scarce resources for ecological
purposes as a rich country's
luxury.

Environmental issues are a relatively
new aspect of intemational relations, and
one in which American and Chinese interests could readily collide. 15 The December
1997 meeting in Kyoto on global climate
change yielded a proposed treaty that
would commit the United States and other

Poor countries like China believe that
they cannot afford to sacrifice current income to avoid the uncertain costs of environmental damage 50 or 100 years from
now. Even though air pollution is a visibly
serious problem (coal generates 75 percent
of its energy), China considers use of scarce
resources for ecological purposes as a rich
country's luxury. Thus, trying to convince
that nation to limit its energy consumption while the major Westem countries use
5 to 10 times as much per person will probably prove futile-unless wealthier countries such as the United States pay the
global costs of reducing fossil fuel usage.
Nevertheless, air pollution is a growing
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Environmental Issues

problem in the major Chinese cities. China's
extreme dependence on its domestic coal
supply for energy also could generate other
serious problems if it turns to less-polluting sources of energy. The vast and still
mainly untapped oil and gas reserves of the
South China Sea are an important potential alternate source of energy. Overlapping
portions of that strategic area are also
claimed by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the
Philippines, and Taiwan. Furthermore, all
ocean shipping among those six countries,
as well as the transport of oil from the Persian Gulf to Japan, takes place across the
South China Sea.

Reconciling Divergent Interests
When asked the meaning of the French
Revolution, Zhou Enlai was supposed to
have replied, "It is too soon to tell." 16 In
this vein, it is with some reluctance that I
will try to pull together the various strands
of Sino-U.S. connections. Policymakers in
both the United States and China face
fundamental challenges in attempting to
deal simultaneously with a host of contentious economic, political, social, religious,
military, and environmental issues. 17 Not
all of these serious matters can be solved
soon. It would be sensible to focus on the
highest priorities.
A useful starting point is to note that
China's isolation is ending. Today it is more
open to the influences of Western culture
and business practices than ever before. Its
senior officials say they want their country
to be a full participant in the world economy.
They acknowledge that this requires China
to move to a market economy and to modernize its society. Yet China is not now a
member of key international organizations,
formal and informal, such as the WTO and
the annual economic summits.
12

The United States is in a special position to aid China in its entry into the "club"
of developed nations. Mter all, compared
to European countries such as Britain,
France, and Germany, the United States
is one of the newer members of that club.
We also have a major stake in China's success in its effort to move out of its isolationist setting. As a key Pacific power, it is
to our benefit to encourage the rise of a
China that interacts regularly with and is
at peace with its neighbors.
Not all American interests will benefit
from China's entry into the WTO. Some
investors will lose the preferential treatment now accorded to foreigners. China's
pledges to open its markets to foreign distribution channels are less than firm
guarantees. On the other hand, China's
membership in WTO may open the way
to Taiwan's membership as a separate
customs territory. 18

In the broadest sense, China
and the United States are
complementary in terms oftheir
basic economic needs and
resources.

In the broadest sense, China and the
United States are complementary in terms
of their basic economic needs and resources. We are China's leading export
market as well as the most logical partner to help upgrade its technology through
investment and joint venturing. In turn,
China is the most promising new market
for American business and agriculture.
China's huge development and infrastructure needs can provide enormous
13

export and investment opportunities for
U.S. companies seeking geographic diversification. In the important area of higher
education, U.S. colleges and universities
are a popular place for wealthier Chinese
to send their children, especially for graduate education. Such activity has the added
potential of generating personal and intellectual bridges between the two nations.
However, China's distance from the West
is greater than a glance at the globe suggests. Surely, the bombing of the Chinese
offices in Belgrade, although presumably
unintentional on our part, was at least a
temporary setback in Sino-U.S. relations
and we should be candid in acknowledging
the consequences. Above and beyond such
current events, central differences exist in
historical experience, cultural orientation,
and political and social institutions. To
state the matter candidly, the rule oflaw as
westemers view the notion is still essentially a foreign concept in China, a special
import that it seems to welcome with minimum enthusiasm. Viewed in this light, let
us see how we can deal with the main issues that will either separate our two powerful nations or bring them closer.
It may be surprising for an economist
to start with military rather than economic
issues, but matters of war and peace are
fundamental. The continued expansion of
China's military power should be acknowledged as potentially destabilizing. However,
the sensible response is not to try to talk
Beijing out of what it thinks is a reasonable position.
Instead, we should simply but clearly
note that, in terms of our vital interests,
the expansion of China's armed strength
provides a compelling justification for the
maintenance of a substantial U.S. military
presence in East Asia. The United States
maintains security alliances with Japan,
14

South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand,
and Australia. Yet a China that is secure
from foreign threat and can protect its
legitimate sovereignty is desirable for both
Asian and American vital interests. On the
other hand, coercive pressure by China
against its neighbors in the South China
Sea or against Taiwan only serves to escalate tensions in East Asia. Alleviation of
tensions requires restraint on the part of
many parties. One expert in intemational
law, for example, has urged Taiwan to "look
like a state, act like a state ... but not formally declare its independence." 19

To state the matter candidly, the
rule of law as westerners view
the notion is still essentially a
foreign concept in China, a
special import that it seems to
welcome with minimum
enthusiasm.

Anyone who follows domestic political
trends in the United States knows that
strong pressure exists for devoting an increasing share of the federal budget to
domestic matters such as strengthening
Social Security and Medicare. Our willingness to assign a significant amount of our
military resources to East Asia reflects the
high priority that we give to stable conditions in that region. At the same time, better relations with China may allow the
United States eventually to resume limited
sales of defensive weapons to China. No
action would do more to alleviate Beijing's
fear of a policy of containment on our part.
In the area of economic policy, the
United States remains the main bulwark
15

of free flows of commerce and capital across
the globe. Nevertheless, because we are a
democracy, we respond to the concems of
our citizens as expressed in the political
process. Thus, when Chinese officials dismiss these concems as "just domestic politics," they demonstrate that they do not
yet understand how a democracy works.

In developing closer relations
with China, tradeoffs are inevitable . ... Our government must
balance concern for human
rights against other important
interests which also have significant moral aspects-such as
peace, national security, and
prosperity of our citizens.

It is extremely optimistic for China to
expect that we can maintain a fully open
market to their products in the face of so
many adverse factors: (1) a host of Chinese barriers to U.S. exports, (2) severe
restraints on the operations of U.S. firms
in China, (3) lack of a functioning legal
system that provides local citizens as well
as foreigners with essential protection of
individual liberty and property, and (4) overt
discrimination against and persecution of
people that many Americans identify with.
Nevertheless, it is counterproductive for
us to try to tell China what to do under
those circumstances. It is most appropriate for the United States to clearly explain
our position, motivation, and actions. We
can sincerely hope that China continues
to open up its economy-including the general use of the intemet-and to achieve
16

more of the freedoms to which the citizens
of other advanced societies have grown
accustomed. The United States should
support China's entry into the World Trade
Organization-but without any special
preferences. Judged strictly from the viewpoint of American interests, the likelihood
is that China will be a more responsible
world citizen operating on the inside rather
than the outside, but there are no firm
assurances in such matters.
However, if China chooses not to take
more enlightened positions, it will postpone
the time when it gains full membership in
the global marketplace and the family of
modem societies. Clearly our preference
is to welcome China into that desirable
relationship sooner rather than later.
In developing closer relations with
China, tradeoffs are inevitable. While private organizations emphasizing single issues
are free to take absolutist positions, it is
foolish for govemments to do so. Our govemment must balance concem for human
rights against other important interests
which also have significant moral aspectssuch as peace, national security, and prosperity of our citizens.
The United States maintains peaceful
and friendly relations with many nations
that do not share our fundamental beliefs.
But those relationships are not nearly as
strong or as enduring. A virtuous circle is
possible. Closer economic and individual
ties in tum can lead to improved mutual
understanding-and vice versa. Thus, we
should welcome the development of improved relations with China and further
progress in the day-to-day interactions of
our people. But we should be prepared for
more pragmatic relationships and less
happy outcomes.
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